3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDI Rumania EDI



control over the situation. Admittedly the postwar attitude to be adopted by the Soviet Union was by no means clearly foreseen in 1944–1945, and as suggested above it may not have been altogether fixed, but if, as it appeared in 1950, any effort at American-Soviet agreement in eastern Europe involved fitting a square peg in a round hole there was not, during the period of uncertainty, even an effort to shave off some of the sharper edges of the peg.

In any event, whatever slight chances there might have been of resolving the Rumanian political crisis, through international agreement and peaceful internal adjustment, had disappeared by the time the elections were held. The National Peasants and Liberals naturally refused to accept the results, and their delegates did not occupy their seats in the parliament. In a formal communiqué of November 25, 1946, Maniu and Brătianu, after enumerating the electoral outrages, concluded: "Our parties consider that they can no longer authorize their representatives to continue to collaborate with the present government, the perpetrator of fraudulent and blood stained elections, with which they can have no solidarity whatsoever." [9] The United States and Great Britain did not accept the elections as representing the opinion of the Rumanian people or as complying with the assurances given by the Groza government.

The peace treaty with Rumania, which had been drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers in the course of 1946 and was finally signed on February 10, 1947, did not materially alter the situation. Although Article 3 obliged Rumania to secure for all persons "the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press, of publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meeting," it was in nowise observed.[10]

9. See the annex to the booklet published by the Rumanian National Committee, *Suppression of Human Rights in Rumania* (Washington, D.C., September, 1949), a hostile but heavily documented indictment of the Groza regime.

10. Some of the main points of the treaty, which in general followed the lines of the 1944 armistice, were: frontiers to be as of January 1, 1941, except for the Hungarian frontier which remained as of January 1, 1938; the obligation to repeal and henceforth not to pass any measures discriminating against persons for sympathizing with the United Nations; dissolving and not permitting in the future any organization of a fascist type or other organization conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or other United Nations; limitation of the army to 120,000 persons; reparations in kind to the U.S.S.R. to the amount of $300,000,000, payable in eight years from September, 1944; guarantee of economic and property rights of United Nations nationals; German assets in Rumania to go to the Soviet Union; free commercial navigation on the Danube for all states; Allied forces to be withdrawn from the country within ninety days of the treaty's coming into force, except for the Soviet right to retain forces necessary to maintain the line of communication with the Soviet Zone in Austria.

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1



imposed on Rumania. The territorial losses Rumania had to suffer were comparatively light as contrasted with the draconian economic clauses of the treaty, and comprised the cession of the entire Dobrudja, and of a district of 2,920 sq. miles along the mountain passes of the Carpathians. Rumania as a solace, was allowed to annex Bessarabia, which had already been abandoned by Russia and had demanded its union with Rumania in March, 1918. The ratification of the treaty was delayed, however, King Ferdinand anticipating an Entente victory which would liberate Rumania from the onerous clauses the Germans sought to impose on her.

The collapse of the Bulgarian front and the victorious Allied offensive in the west soon justified these hopes. The Rumanians thereupon assumed the offensive on Nov. 9th, 1918, re-occupied Wallachia, re-entered Transylvania which had in December, 1918, proclaimed its union with Rumania, marched into Bucovina, the Rumanians of which province had formed a provisional government on Oct. 27th, 1918, and had invoked the assistance of the Rumanian troops, and by April, 1919, reached the line of the river Theiss. Rumania's definite frontiers, however, were to be traced by the diplomats after protracted and unedifying wranglings in Paris.

## RUMANIA AND THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

It is usual to accuse the Rumanians of having evinced at the Peace Conference an intolerance and superciliousness that did not at all accord with the services they had rendered to the Allied cause. The Entente Powers alleged that the Rumanians, having concluded a separate peace with the enemy, had thereby forfeited their rights to the territories which had been originally promised them. Besides, President Wilson had taken up a most determined attitude against all secret treaties, and as Rumania's claims were based on them it is easy to understand that immense difficulties were encountered before a settlement was effected.



C

728 The Rumanians might well have retorted that the disaster they had suffered was due mainly to the absence of the assistance the Entente had pledged itself to grant, and that to evoke the case of the peace of Bucarest, which after all had not been ratified by King Ferdinand, was tantamount to making use of a legal flaw in order to avoid moral obligations, an attitude that might be appropriate to the narrow conceptions ruling at a county court, but unworthy of the proceedings of a world areopagus.

Much bitterness was engendered by the arrogance manifested by the delegates of the Great Powers and the arbitrary character of most of their decisions. Thus Rumania was allowed to appoint two delegates to the Conference, while Yugoslavia, with a smaller population, was permitted to send three. Throughout the sittings of the Conference the Rumanian delegates were practically ignored, decisions in matters that interested them were taken over their heads, and injunctions and intimations were transmitted to Bucarest instead of being handed to them, who, after all, were the only competent persons to receive them. Drafts of the treaty with Germany and Austria had been communicated to several journalists while the Rumanian delegation received incomplete summaries, though the conditions imposed on Austria were of vital interest to Rumania. How and for what reasons the Triumvirate, composed of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson, adopted such a slighting attitude towards not only Rumania, but also towards our lesser allies, is only explainable on psychological grounds.

They were obviously unfit to exert such limitless powers as had been conferred on them, and their sudden elevation had apparently obscured their intelligence. For otherwise how could they ignore the clauses of the treaty which had been concluded with Rumania in 1916, which provided that "Rumania shall have the same rights as the Allies in the peace preliminaries and negotiations, and also in discussing the issues which shall be laid before the Peace Conference for its deliberations?"

It must be admitted, however, that M. Bratianu, the head of the Rumanian delegation, and acting prime minister, owing to his arbitrary and intolerant disposition, was not a

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1



728

person whose immixture in these difficult negotiations could exert any auspicious influence upon them. The arrogance with which he rejected the Serbian arguments in favour of the revision of the Russo-Rumanian treaty concerning the Banat, which was characteristic of his attitude, will partly explain why he was not in special favour with President Wilson, who was likewise endowed with a rather intolerant disposition. Thus the "Isvestia" of Jan. 19th, 1918, reported that when the Serbian Minister, with the consent of the Russian statesman Milyukov, had approached Bratianu in order to obtain a revision of this treaty, the latter arrogantly replied that he would also ask for the Timok valley across the Danube, which had always formed an integral part of Serbia.

But that which most incensed the Rumanians was the attitude adopted by the Supreme Council on the question of the disposal of the Banat, which had been promised in its entirety to Rumania. Owing to the presence of iron and coal mines in the eastern part of the Banat, a certain group of capitalists who were powerful enough to bring influence to bear on the members of the Supreme Council, came in close contact with Bela Kun, the Hungarian dictator, and secured from him the promise of the bestowal of concessions on their group for the exploitation of these mines, should Hungary be left in possession of the Banat. Thereupon the Supreme Council assumed an attitude which was more than friendly towards Hungary's Bolshevik dictator, and everything was done to thwart the Rumanians from attaining their aim. Though the plan miscarried, owing to the fall of Bela Kun, brought about by Rumania's military intervention, carried out despite the injunctions of the Supreme Council, this intrigue was followed by yet another attempt to set up an independent republic of the Banat, which, owing to its extreme weakness, would have proved very amenable to the will of these international financiers. Then, as if these disgraceful manoeuvres were not enough to inspire disgust at the way the affairs of the Peace Conference were conducted, the Rumanian delegates were pressed to grant industrial concessions to Jewish-American financiers, failing which Rumania was threatened with the loss of America's

728 active support. So cocksure were these gentry of their omnipotence that they even sent representatives to Rumania to earmark in advance whatever enterprises seemed lucrative for them to exploit. It is even averred that finally a note was addressed to the Rumanian delegates enjoining them to grant certain concessions, as otherwise neither diplomatic nor financial help would be forthcoming from the United States.

The spirit of mercantilism which seemed to dominate the decisions taken by the Supreme Council would have sufficed to ruffle the susceptibilities of men of more tolerant disposition than Messrs Bratianu and Mishu. In view of the high stakes at play they did their best to put up with the discourtesies which were showered on them, but when they were prevented from taking part in discussions that affected Rumania directly (thus M. Clemenceau did not hesitate to exclaim in a sitting of the Council to M. Bratianu that the latter was there to listen and not to comment), the Rumanian delegates were obliged to conclude that it consorted better with the maintenance of their dignity to depart, after M. Bratianu had delivered a trenchant attack against the pretensions of the Great Powers to settle the fate of Europe guided uniquely by their own private interests.

These reprehensible altercations go a long way to explain the causal complex of that rabid xenophobia which subsequently inspired the policy of M. Bratianu and his followers. In justice to them it must be conceded that after the treatment meted out to them in Paris they had good reason to eye with grave suspicion any offer of co-operation emanating from western financiers, since at the Peace Conference an attempt had been made to exploit them economically, even blackmail having been employed for the attainment of this object. Nothing has been done to dispel the deplorable impression thus created. On the contrary, the behaviour of their powerful allies at the Spa Conference, where a disproportionally low percentage of reparation payments had been allocated to the Rumanians, could only further confirm their suspicions as to the motives that usually actuate westeners, and this notwithstanding the latters' clever efforts to cloak their mercantilism with a profusion of ethical con-

sidérations all professing to aim at the regeneration of the 728
country to which they were to be applied.

M. Bratianu, by the determination and strength of will displayed in his efforts to counter certain decisions taken by the Supreme Council, whose utter ignorance of the prevailing state of affairs in the Near East was more than manifest, rendered unwittingly a signal service to Europe.

Thus it is really incomprehensible that the members of the Supreme Council should have gone so far as to attempt to propitiate that band of adventurers who under the mask of Bolshevism had usurped the government of Hungary, and to have even allowed them to threaten for a time the very existence of Czechoslovakia. So certain was Bela Kun of enjoying the patronage of the Supreme Council that he did not hesitate to launch an attack on the Rumanian army guarding the banks of the Theiss in July, 1919.

Fortunately for Europe the soldiers of the Magyar Soviet Republic were defeated, and the Rumanians, flouting the objurgations and fulminations hurled at them by the Supreme Council sitting in Paris, completed their victory by occupying Budapest within a fortnight, shattering the government of Bela Kun and removing a grave danger to Europe by extirpating this nest of Bolshevism in its midst.

The inconceivable partiality of the Supreme Council for the Magyar Bolsheviks had created such a parlous state of affairs in the East of Europe that had the Rumanians failed to occupy the city of Budapest it is more than likely that the Magyar Bolsheviks would have joined hands with the Russians over the prostrate bodies of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with the most dire consequences for the fate of our continent.

The Rumanian occupation of Budapest further envenomed their relations with the Supreme Council. Instead of evacuating the city as they were enjoined to do, the Rumanians (having been entirely despoiled by the Austro-Germans, while the latter had occupied Rumania) now attempted to recuperate some of their losses. They therefore refused to depart before they had secured delivery of at least a part of the goods of which they had been despoiled. It was natural for the Rumanians to resent allied intervention

728 in this matter, for at the time that their country was being plundered by the Germans and their allies the Entente had not interposed to protect them. It may be further mentioned that the Rumanians had asked to be allowed to send delegates to Germany to point out to the inter-allied authorities the objects of which they had been defrauded, but their request had been rejected; so that we should not be surprised if on this occasion they decided to take justice into their own hands. The Magyars have of course bitterly complained of the exactions they suffered at the hands of the Rumanians, but, whatever their severity they never attained the magnitude of those suffered by Rumania. Rumania, for instance, possessed 932 locomotives at the time the Austro-Germans occupied her territory, and they left behind them on their departure only fifty!

After the demonstrative departure of M. Bratianu from Paris, the Rumanian government refused to sign the treaties of St Germain, and that relative to the protection of minorities, since its plenipotentiaries had hardly been consulted in their framing, and as a result diplomatic relations between Rumania and the Entente became exceedingly strained. The Supreme Council finally addressed a note in the form of an ultimatum to Rumania, ordering her to withdraw her troops to the frontiers that had been fixed in the meanwhile at Paris, and to sign the Peace treaties, failing which diplomatic relations were to be severed and all further financial aid suspended. M. Bratianu tendered his resignation in guise of a protest, and King Ferdinand thereupon entrusted the government of the country to Dr Vaida-Voevod, who complied with the demands of the Entente, thereby putting an end to the misunderstandings which had arisen. He further succeeded in securing from the Allies the recognition of Bessarabia's union with Rumania, a demand which had previously been put forward by M. Bratianu, but which the Supreme Council had refused to grant, as at the time it was making advances to the Bolsheviks, and striving by every means to secure their goodwill. It was indeed deplorable for the future pacification of the Near East that the Entente Powers had not fallen in at the time with M. Bratianu's request, but only accepted it subsequently, for

M. Bratianu had coupled it with the offer of retroceding southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, an offer that would have propitiated the Bulgarians and secured their friendship to Rumania, a friendship that is of inestimable value to her. At the same time the retrocession of this territory would have enabled Bulgaria to carry out the financial obligations that had been imposed on her by the Treaty of Neuilly, and the taxpayers of the Western Powers would later have been absolved from the privilege of contributing funds for propping up yet another state, rendered insolvent by the ineptitude of their own diplomats, who by this heedless act of theirs also deprived our own exporters and manufacturers of a small but valuable market.

Concerning the final frontiers which the Peace Conference at Paris fixed for Rumania, though in certain cases they were not as favourable as those promised by the Entente Powers in 1916, nevertheless it must be admitted that they are drawn more in accordance with the principle of nationality. Rumania was not granted the line of the river Theiss as she had been promised, as this would have incorporated within her territory a yet larger number of Hungarians. It would have been even better for Rumania if her western frontiers had not extended so far as to include preponderatingly Magyar urban populations such as those of Arad, Grosswardein (Oradea Mare) and Satmar (Satu Mare) the assimilation of which is bound to prove exceedingly difficult, and whose incorporation is likely to be a burden rather than an asset to her exchequer. Even such a sincere friend of Rumania as Dr Seton Watson did not approve of the annexation of these towns, and long before the frontiers were drawn he warned the Rumanians not to allow themselves to be influenced by their super-nationalists. It is highly unfortunate that such an authoritative warning and counsel as is contained in the following lines was not heeded at least by those who were entrusted by our fellow-citizens with the task of looking after the welfare of our continent at the Peace Conference. Yet the admonition was as clear as it was convincing. Dr Seton Watson did not hesitate to affirm, even at the time when Rumania was being cajoled into joining the Allies, and when lavish promises were being

728 made, that "it is to be hoped that such exaggerated demands will be disallowed at the future Conference. The possession of Arad, with its poignant sentimental associations for the Magyar race, would be a permanent challenge to Hungary and would embitter tenfold her relations with Rumania, which must at the best be strained for many years to come." ("Rumania and the Great War," page 96.)

With regard to Bucovina, Rumania secured more advantageous frontiers than those the Allies had promised to concede her in 1916. She obtained the line of the river Dniester as her northern frontier.

The decision with regard to the Banat was not so favourable for Rumania, for the Yugoslavs insisted on incorporating the western part, which was peopled mainly by Serbs, and they protested against the allotment to another Power of a territory which stretched right up to their capital, Belgrade, and would have placed the latter under a permanent menace from another state. In consequence the experts of the Conference had to adjust the frontier as best they could, guided mainly by the principle of nationality. The arrangement is not particularly auspicious, as a small Yugoslav enclave cuts the railway line Temesvar (Temişoara)—Bazias, and leaves the latter town isolated from Rumania. The various nationalities inhabiting the Banat are, however, so intermingled that it was next to impossible to reach a more satisfactory solution.

## THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

668 On Bratianu's[1] resignation, in consequence of the
648 presentation of an ultimatum by the Allies in October,
[728] 1919, King Ferdinand formed a Cabinet presided over by General Vaitoanu, with a mandate to call a general election.

A strong majority composed of heterogeneous left groups was returned, out of which a Cabinet presided over by Dr Vaida-Voevod was formed. He entered upon the difficult and ungrateful task of dispelling misunderstandings with the Entente and signing the Peace treaties. No sooner, however, had this been accomplished, than Dr Vaida-Voevod, while

1 [head of Rumanian delegation to the peace conference, acting prime minister, and leader 32 of Liberal Party -- Analyst]

3

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1



727 socially oppressed sections of the population, stimulated by the Russian Revolution, rose in many regions. The reconstituted Rumanian Army embarked upon a campaign against the Communist government of Hungary and was supported by Allied commanders. An offensive launched in April 1919 led to the capture of Budapest by 4 August. The Hungarian capital was occupied by about 170,000 Rumanian troops. By helping to defeat the Hungarian Revolution they prepared the way for Admiral Horthy's counter-revolutionary régime which has survived to the present day. The Rumanian campaign against Hungary coincided with fierce repressive measures against revolutionary groups in Bessarabia, Moldavia, in the Bukovina, in Eastern Muntenia and in the Banat. Under the pretext of re-establishing peace and order the Rumanian government crushed all the revolutionary forces whose existence might have endangered it.

728 THE NEW STATE. The long drawn-out negotiations in Paris which were to shape the final form of the Peace Treaties found Rumania in a very unfavourable position. The forceful personality of I. Bratianu, who put forward excessive and unreasonable demands for the expansion of Rumania, and the excesses of the Rumanian troops in Hungary, who requisitioned and transferred great quantities of railway and other materials to the Old Kingdom, estranged many of Rumania's friends. In spite of that, and thanks to the intervention of Queen Marie, Rumania emerged as the greatest and most populous of all Balkan States.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1



From the very beginning three factors influenced the new State. The territorial gains of Rumania put the country into the ranks of the 'satisfied' powers whose main aim was the preservation of the *status quo*. Moreover, the foreign policy of Rumania had to be based upon the support of Britain and France, who were interested in the strengthening of those States which had been created or enlarged as a result of Allied aid. Another decisive influence was the presence of great numbers of minorities within the borders of Greater Rumania. Apart from the internal problems involved, this was also a continuous source of trouble with at least two of the neighbouring States—Hungary and the Soviet Union. The third, and by no means least important, was the question of social reform and the unification of the administrative machinery.

**FOREIGN POLICY.**[1] All parties in the State agreed upon the foreign policy to be pursued. Support of French interests in South-Eastern Europe coincided with those of the ruling classes of Rumania. The defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia against the revisionist claims of Hungary, known as the 'Little Entente', was sponsored by France, concluded in 1920 and maintained up to September 1938 when Czechoslovakia was forced to make territorial concessions to Germany, Hungary and Poland. In 1921 Rumania concluded a defensive alliance with Poland directed against any westward advance of the Soviet Union and later joined the 'Balkan Entente', whose purpose it was to prevent Bulgaria from regaining territories taken from her. Rumania was throughout the ally of France.

[1] [Of the period from 1919 to 1939--Analyst] BSR

11: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 ED1 Rumania ED1

# A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

UNTIL 1940 Romania, a strong force for peace, contained within her boundaries all her historical domain and most of her people. In 1940, amid world-wide changes, she saw her racial and territorial unity shattered in a partition involving not less than one-third of her population of 20,000,000 and of her territory of 113,917 square miles.

The beneficiaries of this forcible division were Russia and Hungary.[1] On July 3, 1940, following an ultimatum, Russia invaded northern Bucovina, part of the Moldavian county of Dorohoi, and all of Bessarabia, altogether some 17,000 square miles with upward of 3,750,000 inhabitants. On September 13, 1940, following the Vienna arbitration decision of August 30, Hungary occupied half of Romanian Transylvania, again some 17,000 square miles with almost 2,400,000 inhabitants.

The two squeezes from east and west, timed to coincide with the collapse of the last vestiges of the European system of regional guarantees, could not be opposed by Romania. The retirement of her armies from Bucovina and Bessarabia reflected the realities of the situation, but did not imply a renunciation of her historic rights to the lost provinces, nor was this loss ratified formally by her parliament. On the contrary, Premier General Ion Antonescu, several times in his earliest official statements, reasserted Romania's claim to the whole of Transylvania; and less than one year later, on June 22, 1941, he led the Romanian armies in the liberation of Bucovina and Bessarabia.

The problems which the action of Russia and Hungary has restored to an acute phase are as old as the ideologies that give them form. Heretofore, as local problems, they have been allowed to smolder under temporary solutions enforced in high-handed and arbitrary manner. Today, as obstacles to the peace and progress of the world, they have become world problems. As such they require a lasting solution that must accord with

[1] A rectification of the frontier of Dobrudja accepted by Romania and Bulgaria as a permanent settlement of the differences between them was effected by the treaty signed at Craiova September 7, 1940. The treaty provided for the return to Bulgaria of the two counties of Caliacra and Durostor ceded by her to Romania at Bucharest, July 27, 1913, at the end of the Balkan wars from which Bulgaria emerged with a net territorial gain of 6,052 sq. mi. Provision was also made for a wide exchange of populations. Bulgaria also undertook to pay Romania one billion lei as indemnity for losses resulting from the territorial transfer and to take over the maintenance of the Romanian graves and battle monuments dating from the 1877-78 war to which Bulgaria owes the restoration of her statehood.

...: Clark S-4 (no date) 1942 EDI Rumania EDI
[TRANSYLVANIA]



175 was then pointed out to her, was in effect but a specious plea for the perpetuation of a 1000-year old injustice."

162 728 That claim had been based mainly on historical, geographical and economic arguments. Whatever effort was made to present it from the viewpoint of the populations whom it would have affected referred in the main to the compact mass of the Szekelys, the twelfth century colonists inhabiting today the exact geographical center of post-War Romania. Romania contended that the cession to Hungary of this mass of aliens would have carried with it an even greater number of Romanians living in the territory separating the Szekelys from Hungary. As long as it will stand, the Award of Vienna will serve to prove the Romanian contention of twenty years ago. In figures the picture is as follows:

**Census of 1930**
**Racial Composition of the Population Ceded to Hungary**

| County | Romanian | Hungarian | German | Jewish | Others | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Bihor | 136,351 | 130,127 | 2,101 | 20,420 | 16,549 | 305,548 |
| 2. Ciuc | 20,976 | 120,627 | 439 | 2,383 | 1,381 | 145,806 |
| 3. Cluj | 141,607 | 85,284 | 2,669 | 16,057 | 11,034 | 256,651 |
| 4. Maramures | 93,207 | 11,174 | 3,239 | 33,828 | 20,127 | 161,575 |
| 5. Mures | 115,773 | 121,282 | 11,271 | 9,848 | 11,564 | 269,738 |
| 6. Nasaud* | 103,897 | 7,488 | 21,211 | 6,450 | 6,528 | 145,574 |
| 7. Odorhei | 5,430 | 112,375 | 454 | 1,250 | 2,475 | 121,984 |
| 8. Salaj | 192,821 | 107,662 | 16,010 | 13,380 | 13,474 | 343,347 |
| 9. Satu Mare | 178,525 | 74,191 | 9,530 | 23,967 | 8,664 | 294,875 |
| 10. Somes | 169,942 | 33,870 | 351 | 10,546 | 4,646 | 219,355 |
| 11. Tarnava Mare | 270 | 62 | 656 | 7 | 15 | 1,010 |
| 12. Tarnava Mica | 131 | 1,580 | 3 | 42 | 165 | 1,921 |
| 13. Trei Scaune | 17,505 | 105,834 | 760 | 707 | 2,963 | 127,769 |
| Total | 1,176,433 | 911,556 | 68,694 | 138,885 | 99,585 | 2,395,153 |

*Inclusive of the population, numbering 1,443, of the villages of Cosna and Carlibaba Noua transferred from the County of Nasaud to the County of Campulung, Bukovina, as of September 29, 1925.

The recovery by Hungary of 911,556 of her nationals thus caused Romania to lose a population of 1,176,433 Romanians. (An official 1940 estimate based on current vital statistics lists 978,074 or 37.1% Hungarians and 1,304,903 or 50.2% Romanians in the ceded territory.) The recovered Hungarian population lies broadly in two groups: a central group, mainly Szekelys, as we have seen, in the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei and Trei Scaune, extending also into the county of Mures, or in all 460,118 souls; and a western group in the border counties of Cluj, Salaj, Bihor,

*Letter of A. Millerand, President of the Peace Conference, replying on behalf of the Allies, May 6, 1920.



1 [cession of territory by Vienna agreement in 1940- --Analyst]

Satu Mare and Maramures, or 408,438 souls. The remainder of 43,000 Hungarians in the territory recently awarded Hungary live scattered over a region containing not less than 274,240 Romanians, besides other races. 162 728

Clearly, a permanent solution of the Hungaro-Romanian problem would have had to recognize this geographical distribution and treat each group on its merits.

The western group of 408,438 Hungarians forms 30.0% of the total population (1,361,996) of the region containing them; the Romanians there number 742,509, or 54.5%, and other nationalities 211,049, or 15.5%. At the preliminary conference held in the early Summer of 1940 at Turnu Severin between Hungarian and Romanian delegates seeking a direct amicable settlement of the dispute, the Romanian delegation could not fail to point out that by an equitable rectification of the then existing frontier and an exchange of populations a settlement could be reached that would in effect reduce to a minimum the number both of Hungarians in Romania and of Romanians in Hungary. But the Hungarian delegation, instructed to claim the whole of Transylvania, would not entertain a practical and real settlement. As a consequence, 742,509 Romanians and 211,049 other nationalities, or a total of 953,558 non-Hungarians, were turned over to a bitter foster-government to make possible the repatriation of the 408,438 Magyars of Western Transylvania. As beneficiary of a settlement that delivers to her two unwilling aliens for every one of her nationals, Hungary has proved again that she is not interested in the creation of conditions that would insure a firm peace, but in an expansion which, at the cost of her neighbors, will enable her to assume the role of Hapsburg Austria in the East. 648 [728]

The central Hungarian group in Transylvania poses a different problem. This group, non-contiguous with the Hungarian frontier traced in 1920, had even before that date shown but little interest in Hungary, to them a distant country; their concern had mostly been in Moldavia, adjoining and familiar territory where they often sought and found profitable employment. There are thus grounds to doubt that they could find satisfaction in their present position, isolated as it is by the new Vienna boundary from main railway connections, from their natural economic outlet of Brasov and the opportunities of steady employment in Romania. Nor, seemingly, could they find comfort in an embittered atmosphere, in the close everyday contact with the 159,684 Romanians living among them or in the solid block of 273,839 Romanians that divide them in the north from their kinsmen. 162

* [preceeding the Vienna[19] agreement in 1940 -- --Analyst]

## TERRITORIAL LOSSES

728 In 1940 Rumania suffered serious loss of territory. First in August, Bessarabia and the Northern Bucovina were occupied by the Russians; then a few weeks later Northern Transylvania was given to Hungary by the Vienna Award, following which the Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Craiova. However, in 1941 Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were regained so that the loss of these territories was of only temporary significance.

[151] [161]

| *Territory* | *Area sq. km.* | *Population in millions* | *Date of Loss* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina | 50,000 | 3.3 | *August* 1940 |
| Northern Transylvania | 43,700 | 2.75 | *Sept.* 1940 |
| Southern Dobruja | 7,700 | 0.38 | *Sept.* 1940 |

The temporary loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had serious repercussions on the economic situation of the country, which were of wider effect than might be supposed from the limited time of the annexation, because of the loss of the harvests of both 1940 and 1941, the "scorched earth" policy of the Russians and the dislocation of the transport system caused by the necessary re-conversion to standard European gauge from the Russian gauge.

The cession of Northern Transylvania, apart from the mere physical loss of territory and population, caused a severe disruption of the economic system on account of the valuable raw materials involved, and the loss of industry which had been built up on the basis of these raw materials. The capital invested in industry in this area represented some 13 per cent. of total investments in industry in the whole country. The main features were the mineral resources of the Baia Mare district, containing lead, zinc, gold, silver and small quantities of copper, with lead-refining plants attached. In this area deposits of pyrites were fairly considerable and supplied the bulk

728
13.5

[5a]

728 of requirements for sulphuric acid production. Of lesser importance were the salt and coal deposits. [135]

The forest resources of Northern Transylvania are estimated to have accounted for as much as 25 per cent of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries appear to have been the most developed. This area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus after local needs had been covered. Of livestock losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep. [313] [311] [233]

The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other. [496]

Calacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

## TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

146 262 Largely because of its cost, the consumption of sugar is very low, except among the well-to-do in the towns. (To encourage sugar-beet growing, a high price was set by the Government.)

[785] The diet is further impoverished by the long religious fasts—seven weeks before Easter, six weeks before Christmas, two shorter summer periods, plus Wednesdays and Fridays of each week. The diet during the fast includes practically no food of animal origin. Children under 10 years do not normally observe these fasts and, in fact, usually have a better diet during these periods since more milk, eggs and butter are available for them.

The diet, though fairly adequate in energy value, is short of animal protein, fats and calcium; moreover, where maize is the principal cereal lack of vitamin $B_1$ may be very serious. Various symptoms of vitamin and mineral deficiencies are [165] observed, and the high infant-mortality rate—the highest in Europe—is also partly due to malnutrition. One of the most serious effects of the poor diet is the nervous disease pellagra, caused by this deficiency of the vitamin $B_1$ factor. In Moldavia, where maize is the staple food, about 5 per cent. [164] of the rural population suffers from pellagra every spring. In the whole country about 3,000 deaths occur each year from this disease (compared with 4,000 in the maize-eating southern states of U.S.A.).

The average annual pre-war food consumption of Rumania is shown in the following table, with comparative figures for the United Kingdom.

*Average per Head Consumption*

| | *Rumania* | | *United Kingdom* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Kg.* | *Lb.* | *Kg.* | *Lb.* |
| Wheat and rye | 104 | 229 | 129 | 285 |
| Maize | 166 | 365 | — | — |
| Potatoes | 50 | 110 | 84 | 185 |
| Sugar | 5 | 11 | 43 | 95 |
| Meat | 17 | 37 | 63 | 139 |
| Milk | 70 | 123* | 94 | 165* |
| Butter | 1 | 2 | 11 | 24 |
| Pig fat | 4 | 10 | 5 | 11 |
| Vegetable oil | 1·5 | 3 | — | — |
| Margarine | — | — | 4 | 10 |
| Calories per day | 2,700 | | 3,100 | |

*Pints

## B. WAR-TIME CHANGES

### 1. Territorial Changes

● 728 241 311 The net effect of the territorial changes which have occurred since 1939 is the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. For two seasons' crops, 1940 and 1941, Rumania was without Bessarabia, but in the late summer of 1941 she not only regained Bessarabia but acquired administrative control of the Soviet territory now styled Transnistria, and this has made small contributions to the food supplies of Rumania in 1942-43. Ignoring Transnistria, however, Rumania lost 12 per cent. of her former arable area and grain production. The Transylvanian areas ceded to Hungary, though not rich agriculturally, probably needed only small imports of grain to supplement their own production, while south Dobruja, though a surplus producing area, contributed only a fraction to Rumania's total agricultural production. The country's potential agricultural export remains, therefore, substantially what it was before the war.

### 2. Agriculture in War Years

241 722 Germany, at the outbreak of the war, looked to the Danube countries, and to Rumania in particu-

328 was no zinc-smelting capacity until 1940 when the "Sonemin" concern (Societatea Nationala de Exploatări Miniere şi Industriale S.A.R.) erected a plant at Copşa Mica with a capacity for 6,000 tons of crude zinc annually. The smelter has three retorts fired by natural gas, treating concentrates first roasted at the Phœnix works.

### 3. Pre-War Production and Trade

Ore production increased over the years 1934-1938, statistics available are conflicting, but it is certain that 1938 production in terms of lead content was not less than 7,000 tons. Smelter production also increased from 4,000 tons to about 7,000 tons, and averaged about 5,000 tons over the period. Exports and imports of lead were very small.

Ore production in terms of zinc content varied between approximately 4,000 tons and 8,000 tons. The concentrates were all exported, chiefly to Poland. Metallic zinc was imported almost entirely from Belgium and Poland.

The small output of lead and zinc was of little importance other than to Rumania herself.

### 4. War-time Development

[728] [439] As practically the whole of the Rumanian lead-zinc industry passed to Hungary when she acquired the Baia Mare district under the Vienna Award, Rumania became largely dependent on imports for the satisfaction of her lead and zinc requirements. However, she retained the Transylvanian Erzgebirge and other areas containing lead-zinc deposits, some of which she is now endeavouring to exploit. For instance, it was reported in December 1942 that deposits in the Banat, near Agadici, and in the Hunedoara district, were being developed. The Copşa Mica zinc smelter has remained in Rumanian hands.

## D. MICA

316 135 The Germans are taking considerable interest in the mica deposits discovered in the Mehedinţi district, though little is believed to be of high quality. The present annual rate of production is estimated to be about 150 tons.

## E. BAUXITE

135 Rumania possessed reserves of bauxite situated in the Bihor Massif and estimated by German experts in 1939 at some 40 million tons. The main deposits are located in the Poiana, Crisul Repede and Jad Valleys, and in the Galbina valley south-east of Beiuş. Small deposits exist around Remetea and Bratca, in the district around Piatrassa and near Turda.

31 Despite the size of her ore reserves, Rumania's production of bauxite has never been important, largely because of its unsuitability for the Bayer process, which is mostly operated in European alumina plants. Pre-war output never exceeded 10,000 tons annually, and was mostly consumed at home in the manufacture of cement and refractory bricks.

Mining operations were carried on before the war by three companies:—

(a) *Bauxita S.A.R.*, a subsidiary of the Swiss Aluminium Industrie A.G. Chippis which owned mines at Dobreşti and produced small quantities of bauxite for the Rumanian cement industry.

[226]

328 The Rumanian production of argentiferous ores was treated by refineries at Baia Mare and Zlatna and at the Phœnix refinery at Satu Mare, all of which are in the area ceded to Hungary.

**2. Pre-War Production**

Silver production increased at a much higher rate than gold production over pre-war years; 1937 silver output was nearly double that of 1935, and more than four times as great as that of 1932. However, there was a considerable fall from 824,480 in 1937 to 502,890 troy ounces (metal in ore), in 1938.

**3. War-time Developments**

328 316 A Rumanian authority has estimated that with the loss of the Baia Mare (Nagybanya) area under the Vienna Award, Rumania was deprived of as much as 87 per cent. of her silver production. Efforts are being made, however, to increase production from the considerable deposits still remaining under Rumanian control. Increased premiums are also being paid on silver mined as from the 1st January, 1943.

505 648 Danube nearly doubled. The Rumanian river traffic is now in fact under German control, which is enforced through a number of official and semi-official bodies. German transport officers operating in the main river ports are regulating all river shipping.

Working in close collaboration with the German railways and the *Frachleitstelle Südost*, Berlin (the office which controls river and sea navigation) the Rumanian authorities are bound to the orders given by this office, which must immediately receive reports of any transport exceeding 1,000 tons between Rumania and other countries. Oil transports are excepted as these are handled centrally by a special body which collaborates with the Rumanian Railway Administration and with the Danube Shipping Agencies

**5. The Inland Fleet**

505 At the beginning of 1940, the Rumanian inland fleet consisted of the following craft :—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Passenger boats .. | 25 | |
| Tug boats .. | 127 | |
| Cargo barges .. | 553 | with a capacity of 469,546 tons |
| Tankers .. .. | 66 | with a capacity of 41,603 tons |

Accurate figures of the Rumanian tonnage park have not been published recently, but press reports at the end of 1942 stated that shipping under the Rumanian flag on the Danube carried only 28 per cent. of Rumania's Danube traffic.

505 648 **III. Administration of the Danube**

Before the war the administration of the Danube was in the hands of two Commissions, the C.I.D. (International Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube from Brăila to Ulm, a distance of 2,417 km. (1,500 miles), and the C.E.D. (European Danube Commission) in charge of the Danube delta—i.e. from Brăila to the Black Sea—a distance of 171 km. (106 miles). Both these Commissions were established by the Treaty of Paris as long ago as 1856.

● 729 After the 1914-18 war, the two Commissions were reconstituted under the Treaty of Versailles, and the constitution, powers and functions of each laid down in Articles 331-339 and 346-353 of that Treaty.

**C.I.D. (International Danube Commission)**

Under the Treaty of Versailles this Commission was composed of the following riparian States :—

2 members from Bavaria and Württemburg.

1 each from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria.

In addition, the three non-riparian members of the C.E.D., viz., Great Britain, France and Italy, were each allocated one representative.

This Commission was only a provisional one, intended to function pending the creation of a permanent régime. This was accomplished in July, 1921, and under the Statute of the 23rd July of that year, the Powers having representation were identical with those prescribed by the Versailles Treaty.

Article 1 of the Statute provides that the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea must be free and open to all flags without any discrimination whatsoever. The functions and powers of the C.I.D. are laid down in Articles 9-42, and are concerned with the drawing up of programmes of improved works, the levying of customs dues, police regulations and the control of revenues resulting from customs and navigation dues.

## A. POPULATION

### 1. General

161 Before discussing the labour situation in Rumania, it is essential to point out that a number of substantial changes have taken place between 1930 and 1942. The results of all these are shown in the table below. The last official census (in 1930) showed the total population of Greater Rumania as 18,057,000. Allowing for natural increase, the population for 1930 was probably about 20,000,000.

161 728 In August 1940 the U.S.S.R. occupied Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia with a combined population of 3·67 million, while in July 1941 these areas were regained with a reduced population of 3·30 million, the reduction of ·37 million being due to Russian deportations.

In September 1940 Hungary acquired northern Transylvania, including the provinces of Crişana and Maramureş and a population of 2·75 million. This was followed by a further loss of the southern Dobruja to Bulgaria with a population of 0·38 million. Some 200,000 Germans were repatriated from eastern Rumania, mainly to Poland.

161
728

the northern sections of Transylvania and Crişana to Hungary, though it should be noted that a considerable block of Rumanians, of whom over 200,000 have returned as refugees, were placed within Hungary by the new frontier. The German minority was little affected by the territorial changes, but some 200,000 from Eastern Rumania were "repatriated," mainly to Poland. The remaining 350,000 are situated chiefly in the Banat and in southern Transylvania. The Jewish population was distributed as follows :—

[162]

| | |
|---|---|
| Bessarabia and Bucovina | 300,000 |
| Moldavia | 158,000 |
| Muntenia | 87,000 |
| Transylvania, Crişana and Maramureş | 180,000 |

(*See* paragraph on Jewish population on page 56.)

The Bulgarian minority has been returned to Bulgaria partly by the new frontier in the Dobruja and partly by the exchange of Bulgarian and Rumanian nationals which has taken place since 1940.

[54c]

161
728

TABLE SHOWING POPULATION CHANGES BETWEEN 1939-1942

| | Losses | Gains | Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greater Rumania, 1939 .. .. .. .. .. | — | — | 20,000,000 |
| U.S.S.R .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3,070,000 | 3,300,000 | — |
| Hungary .. .. .. .. .. .. | 2,750,000 | 200,000 | — |
| Bulgaria .. .. .. .. .. .. | 380,000 | — | — |
| Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. | 200,000 | — | — |
| Natural increase in population, 1939-December 1942 | — | 400,000 | — |
| Totals .. .. .. .. | 7,000,000 | 3,000,000 | — |
| Population of Rumania, December, 1942 .. .. | — | — | 16,000,000 |

162

## 2. Effect of the Population Changes on the Nationality Distribution

In 1930 only 72 per cent. of the total population was of Rumanian origin. The largest minority groups were Hungarians (8 per cent.) Germans (4 per cent.), Jews (4 per cent.), Ukrainians (3·2 per cent.) and Russians (2·3 per cent.).

162
728

As a result of the territorial changes since 1939 over 85 per cent. of the population are now of Rumanian extraction, and there has been a change in the relative importance of the various minorities. The Hungarian minority has been largely reduced by the cession of the province of Maramureș and

162
728

As a result of these changes it would appear that the largest minority groups are now the Germans, Russians and Ukrainians.

162

### 3. Occupational Distribution

There is no satisfactory official occupational breakdown. Though the 1930 census gives an industrial and commercial breakdown, figures for agriculture and other occupations are lacking. Using such official figures as are available combined with other unofficial information, the following occupational breakdown (column A) has been drawn up for 1939, taking into account increased industrialisation since 1930.

[54f]

## E. THE JEWISH POPULATION

The Jewish population of Rumania for 1938 is given as 800,000, and for July, 1942, as 270,000. This reduction came about as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| *Total*, 1938 .. .. .. .. | 800,000 |
| Lost to Hungary .. .. .. | 200,000 |
| Taken to Russia from Bessarabia and Bucovina by Russians .. .. | 130,000 |
| Expelled from Bessarabia and other areas by Rumanians to Transnistria, and deaths from unnatural causes in Rumania .. .. | 200,000 |
| Total losses .. .. | 530,000 |
| *Total*, 1942 .. .. .. .. | 270,000 |

The occupational distribution of the Jews in 1930 :—

| | *Per cent.* | |
|---|---|---|
| Agriculture .. .. .. .. | 4·1 | |
| Industry and trade .. .. | 32·8 | 81·1 |
| Commerce and credit .. .. | 48·3 | |
| Transport .. .. .. .. | 2·4 | |
| Professions and Public Services .. | 2·7 | |
| Army .. .. .. .. .. | 1·9 | |
| Miscellaneous .. .. .. .. | 7·8 | |

It is calculated that in 1939 at least one-sixth of the industrial and half of the commercial population were Jews. During the war Rumanian policy has been to exclude Jews from business and from commercial and professional activity. This process of Rumanisation, while pursued ruthlessly in the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina, has been limited in the more industrial areas such as Bucarest by the simple fact that Rumanian industry and trade are dependent to such an extent on Jewish capital and leadership, and there is no doubt that the shortage of labour in industry has been seriously aggravated by the anti-Jewish policy. The degree of Rumanisation so far achieved is given by the following examples :—

Bucarest :—
Number of firms employing Jews, November 1940 .. .. 8,126
Number of firms employing Jews, December 1942 .. .. 4,301

Such Jews as are deemed necessary for war production are granted labour permits, whereby they may remain in their profession, but are subject to heavy taxation. Jews who are expelled from their normal activity are compulsorily enrolled in the Jewish labour service and employed chiefly on road work, or, alternatively, they are sent to concentration camps.

(*See* also " Note on Jews in Rumania," Part II, Chapter VIII.)

## F. WAGES

### 1. General

The average wage (industrial, commercial and agricultural professions) in 1938 was 1,853 lei per month. The highest average wages were found in the mining, food and transport industries, followed by commerce, textiles, skins, glass and stone, while in the metallurgical industry wages were below the average. The most noticeable feature of pre-war Rumanian wage statistics is the great regional variations, the extreme averages being 889 and 3,059 lei per month.

During the war, various attempts at fixing the wage level have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the whole it would have been surprising if a wage stop could have been successfully applied in Rumania, because of the great

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI



727 642 in failing to recognize that new "progressive" forces were at work and in refusing to coöperate with them. In Hungary, Ferenc Nagy's Smallholders Party coöperated with the Communists in a coalition government, and Petkov coöperated in the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria. These were applauded as signs of superior liberalism and farsightedness. In neither case, as we have seen, was the end result satisfactory. It was not different in Rumania. The United States and British Governments made efforts to hold the governments concerned and their Soviet patrons to the terms of the Yalta Agreement. They succeeded only in revealing a distressing lack of power behind the written and verbal messages which their diplomats delivered at the respective foreign offices. To this extent it can be said that they actually damaged the native national forces which they aimed to help.

The Western Powers protested, as mentioned, against Vyshinsky's interference in Rumanian affairs and quite properly refused to recognize the Groza Government. Encouraged by this, King Michael in August 1945 appealed to the three signatories of the Yalta Agreement to help him create a "recognized democratic government." The Agreement provided that if differences arose about how democratic and representative régimes were to be created the three signatories should consult. The American and British Governments demanded that a consultation now take place about Rumania. Moscow replied that no differences existed except with regard to Rumanian domestic affairs and that therefore a consultation would be not only superfluous but highly improper. That was that. Soviet troops were in occupation of Rumania, and the Western Powers did not propose to go to war to replace Mr. Groza with Mr. Maniu. Other protests over other infringements of the Yalta undertaking were similarly rebuffed. It was right in one view to make them "for the record." The immediate result, however, was that the Western democracies lost face and non-Communist elements were weakened.

● 728 Simultaneously negotiations had been begun looking to the conclusion of peace treaties with Italy and the former Axis satellites. The peace conference opened in Paris on July 29, 1946. One staff member of the American delegation has said that the draft treaties there presented compared unfavorably with even the maligned

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia



treaties of 1919 and 1920.[1] The treaties as actually signed on February 10, 1947, were no better. The Western Powers tried to arrange that some respect be paid to the principle of self-determination, by plebiscite or otherwise, in settling the ownership of territories in dispute between former Axis states or between them and the victors. They met with no success.

In Rumania's case several important territories were at stake, including Bessarabia, a part of the Bukovina, the northern part of Transylvania and the Southern Dobrudja.

Bessarabia had come into Russian possession first in 1812; had been transferred to Rumania (largely on ethnic grounds) in 1918; and had been retaken by Russia in June 1940, pursuant to an agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov a year earlier. Rumanians have since asserted that the Rumanian Government of 1940 did not formally consent to the Russian annexation but merely evacuated the territory under threat of force. At Paris the Soviet delegates referred to the 1940 transfer as "an agreement," said it had been confirmed by the armistice and made clear that possession was nine-tenths of the law. The peace treaty confirmed this reasoning. The case of Northern Bukovina was somewhat different, though the decision of the peace conference regarding it was the same. Northern Bukovina never in history had been Russian. The province had not been specifically mentioned in the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal of 1939; but Germany had not protested when the Soviets took it over in 1940. The Soviets argued that, as in the case of their territorial demands on the Czechs and the Finns, they required the area for strategic purposes of defense. The bear must protect itself against the carnivorous lamb.[2]

One decision was to Rumania's advantage. In 1940 Ciano and Ribbentrop had handed over the northern part of the Rumanian province of Transylvania to their protégés the Hungarians. When Vyshinsky installed Groza in power in Bucharest on March 6, 1945, he felt that he must give the new Prime Minister some success to

[1] John C. Campbell, "The United States in World Affairs, 1945–1947." New York: Harper's, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1947, p. 134.

[2] Rumania ceded the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria September 7, 1940. The Peace Conference confirmed this also. The United States had favored this arrangement in 1919 and approved it in 1940.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI



advertise to the Rumanian masses, most of whom had never heard his name. On March 8, therefore, Groza was told to ask Stalin for northern Transylvania, and by return telegram he received it as a "present." The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Budapest, so there was nobody there for Moscow to take into account. The Western Allies were not consulted. As a matter of fact, they had no objection to the return of at least most of Transylvania to Rumania, but would have preferred that it be done after study as to whether or not there should be frontier rectifications in favor of Hungarian ethnic groups; and they certainly would have considered it more suitable that the transfer be made after agreement among the Allies rather than unilaterally by one of them.

The steps by which the Communist-dominated Rumanian Government became an absolute Communist dictatorship need not be detailed here.[3] In the beginning there certainly were some non-Communist elements which favored a clean sweep of the old order even though the representatives of the new order were Communists and protégés of the hated Russians. Seizure of the large properties still left in Rumania after the land reforms following the First World War was popular in principle. Rumanian régimes of the inter-war period had not been noted for efficiency or probity, and the Communists hastened to identify all Rumanian statesmen who held democratic beliefs and had a Western orientation with the "old gang" of profiteers and politicians who had mocked the Constitution in the dissolute days of King Carol and had ended by taking Rumania into the war as the ally of the Nazis. The fact that Maniu, the country's leading statesman, was famous for his incorruptibility and stubborn devotion to the Constitution did not deter Communist propaganda from picturing him also as a corrupt relic of the old dictatorial order. The Socialists were, of course, completely outbid by Communist promises of pie in the sky.

But although these tactics had some success at first the only one of them that was based on anything substantial, the gift of land to

[3] For a fuller outline of the postwar evolution in Rumania as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, and of relevant negotiations (if they can be called that) between the Soviets and the Western Powers, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, also volumes for 1947–48 and 1948–49 in the same series by the same author, and the volume for 1949 by Richard P. Stebbins.